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ABSTRACT
Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 1890 and prohibited, among
other practices, monopolization. To prove monopolization, the
government and other plaintiffs must show that a firm both possessed monopoly power and engaged in bad conduct. In interpreting
the spare language of the statute, the courts have identified many
practices that constitute monopolization, including below-cost
pricing, refusals to deal with rivals, and tying. In general, however,
they have failed to explain why these practices are unfair and
restricted by law. Judges have instead applied labels such as
their decisions.
A close examination of the case law reveals that the monopolization doctrine embodies implicit notions of unfairness. Legal preceuse their monopoly power,
financial privileges, or generally prohibited conduct to acquire or
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abilities to use exclusive dealing and below-cost pricing and ban the
use of generally prohibited practices as unfair methods of competition. By proscribing these forms of business rivalry, the FTC would
encourage businesses to grow and succeed through the fair treatment
of trading partners, development of new products, and investment in
new plants, facilities, and technologies.

https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol63/iss1/8

2

Vaheesan: The Morality of Monopolization Law

2022]

THE MORALITY OF MONOPOLIZATION LAW

121

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. THE CONFUSED AND UNDERDEVELOPED STATE OF
MONOPOLIZATION DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. The State of the Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The Judicial Failure to Offer Principles on What
Constitutes Bad Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. THE MORALITY IMPLICIT IN MONOPOLIZATION LAW . . . . . . .
S POWER TO MAKE IMPLICIT MARKET MORALITY
III. THE
EXPLICIT AND CODIFY FAIR COMPETITION RULES . . . . . . . .
A. The FTC as a Maker of Market Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Rules on Unfair Competition the FTC Should
Establish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Published by William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022

122
123
124
126
130
133
133
136
139

3

William & Mary Law Review Online, Vol. 63 [2022], Art. 8

122

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 63:119

INTRODUCTION
The Sherman Act prohibits, among other business practices,
monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracies to monopolize.1 One court described the anti-monopoly provision of the
designed to curb the excesses of monopolists and near-monopolists,
is the equivalent in our economic sphere of the guarantees of free
2
The Supreme
Court and the lower courts have held that the possession of
monopoly power is not sufficient to violate § 2.3 Monopoly power
must be accompanied by bad conduct.4 In contrast, monopoly power
5

That is, the courts distinguish good competition from bad competition and, at least implicitly, accept that
business rivalry is structured by law.
The judiciary has identified several practices, such as below-cost
pricing, refusals to deal, and tying, as acts that can give rise to legal
liability for monopolization. 6 Yet, the courts have failed to articulate
why these practices are bad and, instead, have relied on labels such
7
What Milton
obviously more of an epithet than a word of art. Its legal usage embodies a conclusion rather than the means of determining the legal8
But a close review of the case law shows
an implicit normative criteria info
1. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
nn. Mining & Mfg. Co.), 324 F.3d 141, 169 (3d Cir. 2003) (en
banc).
of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
3. See, e.g.
407 (2004); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
4. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407.
5. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
6. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Obama Administration and Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1611 (2010).
7. See, e.g., Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 452 (7th Cir. 2020).
8. Milton Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IOWA L. REV. 175, 175 (1936).
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of section 2 of the Sherman Act. Specifically, the body of legal
precedent restricts businesses from using their dominance, financial
advantages, or generally prohibited practices to obtain or maintain
a monopoly.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has the authority to codify
rules of unfair competition and make the morality embedded in
Sherman Act case law explicit. Congress gave the FTC expansive

9

Recently, the Democrats on the five-member Commission indicated
they are prepared to use this unfair competition power more fully.10
This Article argues that, under Chair Lina Khan, the FTC should
use this authority to establish clear rules of unfair competition and

11

Accordingly, the FTC should prohibit exclusive dealing by dominant
firms, below-cost pricing by dominant and near-dominant firms, and
the use of generally prohibited practices by all firms as unfair
methods of competition.
I. THE CONFUSED AND UNDERDEVELOPED STATE OF
MONOPOLIZATION DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court established a two-part test for monopolization in 1966 and has stood by it for more than five decades. The
Court and lower courts have held that monopolization requires
monopoly power and improper conduct to obtain or maintain that
power.12 Acts that can trigger § 2 liability include below-cost pricing,
exclusive dealing, and property destruction.13 While offering a list
of bad practices, the courts have failed to offer principles that
distinguish unfair competition from fair competition and have relied

9. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
10. See
Rescinds 2015 Policy That Limited Its
Enforcement Ability Under the FTC Act (July 1, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2021/07/ftc-rescinds-2015-policy-limited-its-enforcement-ability-under
[https://perma.cc/M6F7-45H4].
11. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
12. See, e.g.
of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
13. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 6.
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A. The State of the Law
In United States v. Grinnell Corp., the Court laid out the prevailing test for monopolization. According to Grinnell, two showings
must be made to establish monopolization:
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.15

Monopoly power16 alone is not sufficient for liability.17 The Court
affirmed this in subsequent decisions,18 sometimes even paying
tribute to the public value of monopoly.19 Second, obtaining a
monopoly position solely through a better product is not illegal.
The Supreme Court and lower courts have cataloged a range of
practices that meet the second part of the Grinnell test. These

14. See, e.g., FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 989-90 (9th Cir. 2020). This is a
definitional problem that predates the rise of Chicago School antitrust. Indeed, some of the
landmark antitrust decisions of the mid-twentieth century also failed to articulate the
See generally, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945).
15. 384 U.S. at 570-71.
compass more than just firms with a 50
percent share of a relevant market and have typically defined firms with 70 percent or more
of a relevant market as having monopoly power. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co. v.
Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 451 (4th Cir. 2011).
17. For a textualist argument that the possession of monopoly power should be sufficient
to violate the Sherman Act, see generally Robert H. Lande & Richard O. Zerbe, The Sherman
Act Is a No-Fault Monopolization Statute: A Textualist Demonstration, 70 AM. U. L. REV. 497
(2020).
18. See
that the petitioners' behavior hurt consumers by raising telephone service rates. But that
consumer injury naturally flowed not so much from a less competitive market for removal
services, as from the exercise of market power that is lawfully
19. See
Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).
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include refusals to deal, exclusionary contracting, below-cost pricing
strategies, and certain tortious conduct.20
First, the courts have held that monopolists cannot refuse to deal
with rivals under limited circumstances. Per the antitrust laws,
firms have a general right not to deal with another party, but this
21

In a 1985 decision, the Supreme Court held that a Colorado
ski resort with monopoly power violated the antitrust laws when it
terminated a joint ticketing arrangement with a smaller competitor
and deprived this rival of skiers.22
Second, monopolists cannot use exclusive dealing and functionally
similar contracts with trading pa
access and maintain their monopoly power. The Third Circuit in a
2005 decision affirmed a finding of monopolization against the
leading manufacturer of artificial teeth.23 The court concluded that
the monopolist, by imposing exclusivity on distributors, prevented
rival manufacturers from entering the market and capturing market share.24 In a case involving similar facts in another industrial
sector, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed an FTC decision finding that
a monopolistic manufacturer of iron pipe fittings excluded rivals by
coercing distributors to accept exclusivity.25
Third, monopolists and aspiring monopolists cannot use certain
pricing tactics. Firms cannot engage in below-cost pricing when the

26

In deciding a motion for summary judgment in an antitrust suit
between two rival airlines, the Sixth Circuit held in 2005 that the
plaintiff had introduced enough evidence to take its predation
claims against the monopolistic rival to trial.27
20. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 6.
21. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
22. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985).
Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 196 (3d Cir. 2005).
24. See id. at 190-91. In a 2012 decision, the Third
to purchase (volume or market share) targets [can be] challenged as de facto exclusive dealing
arrangements on the grounds that the discounts induce customers to deal exclusively with the
v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 275 (3d Cir. 2012).
25. See McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 840-42 (11th Cir. 2015).
26. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993)
(quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993)).
27. Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 931 (6th Cir. 2005).
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Fourth, businesses cannot employ tortious and other generally
prohibited practices to obtain or preserve their dominance. These
practices include deception,28 fraud,29 and property destruction.30 In
a 2002 decision, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict against a
smokeless tobacco monopolist.31 The court found that the monopolist
used, among other practices, large-scale theft and destruction of a
at convenience stores and other
retailers.32
B. The Judicial Failure to Offer Principles on What Constitutes
Bad Conduct
the courts have not presented normative criteria for separating good
competition from bad competition. They have not explained what
monopoly power from the permissible acquisition or maintenance of
33

Rather than offer philosophical
grounds for which methods antitrust law permits and which it
proscribes, the judiciary has used empty terms and labels such as
condemning certain practices and blessing others.34 What is the
competitive process? What constitutes anticompetitive conduct?
As a baseline matter, firms are affected by a myriad of laws, apart
from antitrust, that restrict the methods by which firms can
compete. Consider the relationship between copyright law and
business rivalry. A publishing house cannot copy and republish the
titles of a rival without obtaining permission; copyright law
prohibits such unauthorized copying and deprives firms of the

28.
29.
(1965).
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988).
See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176-78
See Conwood Co., L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 787-88 (6th Cir. 2002).
See id. at 795.
Id. at 787-88.
See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
See, e.g., FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 989-90 (9th Cir. 2020).
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ability to compete in this fashion.35 The law also restricts certain
types of advertising as a method of competition. A firm cannot use
deceptive marketing that gives its products an advantage over
competitors.36 For example, a car manufacturer cannot make false
claims about the fuel economy of its vehicles to appeal to budget and
environmentally conscious drivers and increase sales. Nicolas
37

Rather than grapple with different forms of competition and
acknowledge that certain forms are illicit, the courts, in antitrust
decisions, present competition as categorically good. Relying on a
1962 merger case, the courts have consistently stated that the
competition, not
competitors 38 In a similar spirit, judicial decisions state that
requirement for monopolization claims.39 The courts rely on labels
that posit competition as good, which contradicts the fact that the
judiciary does restrict certain forms of competition.
Consider the common choice of words in antitrust decisions. The
40
and
courts describe conduct that
41

42

Practices they proscribe are against competition, while
practices they allow and encourage are for competition. Certain
practices are not unfair or unhealthy forms of competition, but
departures from competition itself.
43

this objective cannot be squared
with current doctrines on monopolization. According to the Court,
35. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a)-(b).
36. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(1), 1125(a)(1).
37. See generally Nicolas Cornell, Competition Wrongs, 129 YALE L.J. 2030 (2020).
38. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993)
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
39. E.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (emphasis
omitted).
40. E.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 322
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004);
Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 2013).
41. E.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342 (1990); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 593 (1986); Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59.
42. FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 1005 (9th Cir. 2020).
43. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
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consumer welfare antitrust, though a hotly contested term without
a settled meaning,44 is concerned with conduct that reduces shortterm output and can raise prices.45 This principle does not fit with
the established rule that monopoly power, the power of a single firm
to reduce output and raise prices, alone is not sufficient to establish
monopolization.46 A monopoly in which pricing decisions are concentrated in the hands of one firm is more insidious from a consumer
welfare perspective than a cartel, in which vigorous price competition and increased output could happen at any time given the
existence of multiple independent firms.47
Monopoly power alone does not violate the Sherman Act. The
Supreme Court has made clear that bad acts must accompany
monopoly power.48 In a 2004 decision, the Court even praised
monopoly power and pricing, writing:
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant
charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an
important element of the free-market system. The opportunity
e first place; it induces risk
taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To
safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly
power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an
element of anticompetitive conduct.49

This tolerance of monopoly pricing power and the requirement for
bad acts in monopolization suits are difficult to reconcile with the
consumer welfare objective. In a February 2022 virtual American
Bar Association event in which I participated, leading antitrust

44. See Maurice E. Stucke,
, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 571
(2012).
45. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 893-94 (2007).
46. See
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004).
47. See High Drug Prices and Monopoly, OPEN MKTS. INST., https://www.openmarkets
institute.org/learn/drug-prices-monopoly [https://perma.cc/8HC9-2EDT].
48. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
49. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407 (emphasis omitted).
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A strict
consumer welfare philosophy would restrict such exercises of pricing
power.
The judicial analysis of predatory pricing further shows the lack
of philosophical content, or at least its underdeveloped quality, in
monopolization doctrine. In Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Court approached articulating principles of
legal versus illegal competition but declined to delve into particulars
on the normative bases of the distinction.51
general rule, the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant
measure of cost [may] reflect[ ] the lower cost structure of the
52

But the Court did not articulate th
wer cost structure of the alleged
53

competition on the merits? The
court declined to say. Other cou
54

Indeed, one application of the consumer welfare philosophy might
55

why are the courts even
concerned with below-cost pricing? Under a rough cost-benefit
analysis, the benefit from actual low prices today seems to exceed
the costs from potential higher prices in the future. Then-Judge
antitrust laws very rarely reject su
low prices today] for the sake of more speculative (future low-price)

50. ABA Antitrust Law Section, Is Consumer Welfare in Hot Water?, YOUTUBE (Feb. 10,
2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TuZkVlSNqGQ (at 1:34:36).
51. See 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993).
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1075 (10th Cir. 2013). The
Ninth Circuit in Qualcomm offered a brief explan

55. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990).
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Yet, current law does deem certain prices to be
too low and in violation of the antitrust laws.
II. THE MORALITY IMPLICIT IN MONOPOLIZATION LAW
Despite the lack of judicial articulation of principles in monopolization cases, certain normative criteria can be inferred from a close
read of the court decisions. The courts have implicitly prohibited
firms from exploiting certain advantages to gain an edge over rivals
and obtain or maintain a monopoly. First, court decisions restrict
firms from using their monopoly power to maintain or extend their
monopoly. Second, they limit firms from employing favorable access
to finance to outcompete rivals on price. Third, they bar firms from
using generally prohibited practices to acquire or maintain their
monopoly power. In contrast, judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act permit the acquisition and maintenance of monopolistic
positions through superior products, services, or investment in
plants and equipment.
First, the courts prevent monopolists from using their dominance
to maintain their monopoly. The Supreme Court alluded to this
however lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, to gain a
57
competitive advantage, or to de
Employing monopoly power to perpetuate or expand a monopoly is
a form of unfair competition.
In monopolization decisions, this anti-coercion purpose has principally come up in two contexts. First, monopolists, under limited
circumstances, cannot refuse to do business with a rival as a means
of excluding it from the market.58 In other words, monopolists
cannot use their dominance in a market and the dependent position
of rivals to marginalize them.59 Second, monopolists cannot coerce
56. Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983).
57. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
rtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
, a refusal to cooperate with rivals can constitute
59. See id. In a similar spirit, the Robinson-Patman Act restricts firms from using their
buyer power to extract discounts and other concessions from suppliers as a method of
competition. Brian Callaci & Sandeep Vaheesan, How an Old U.S. Antitrust Law Could Foster

https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol63/iss1/8

12

Vaheesan: The Morality of Monopolization Law

2022]

THE MORALITY OF MONOPOLIZATION LAW

131

trading partners into not
rivals.60 For example, a monopolistic manufacturer cannot impose
exclusive dealing contracts on wholesalers to prevent rivals from
accessing essential distribution channels and, ultimately, end-use
customers.61
62

Second, firms cannot solely use their advantageous access to
finance to obtain or maintain a monopoly. The rules governing
predatory pricing are based on the belief that firms with deep
pockets due to size or scope of operations or access to favorable
funding should not be allowed to deliberately run losses to capture
market share.63
Brooke Group
implied as much. The Court stated that price reductions tied to a
64
The
majority opinion failed to further explain what conduct does not
qualify as competition on the merits.65 But the decision, on the
whole, can be read for the proposition that using financial advantages to sell goods and services at a loss to acquire or perpetuate a
monopoly is unfair competition.66
Third, firms cannot use generally prohibited practices to acquire
or maintain a monopoly. The Sherman Act restricts firms from
using practices such as deception, industrial sabotage, and property
destruction to obtain a competitive advantage.67 These practices are
prohibited by other laws, at the federal and state levels.68 The
generally applicable prohibitions establish these practices as unfair,
immoral, and illegal for all firms, whether they are large, medium,
or small.69

a Fairer Retail Sector, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 9, 2022), https://hbr.org/2022/02/how-an-old-u-santitrust-law-could-foster-a-fairer-retail-sector [https://perma.cc/6NLP-CYJQ].
60. See McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 841-42 (11th Cir. 2015).
61. E.g., id. at 840-42.
62. Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 453 (7th Cir. 2020).
63. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993).
64. Id. at 223.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 224.
67. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
68. See supra Part I.B.
69. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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Consider legal proscriptions on false advertising. The FTC Act
and the Lanham Act generally ban deceptive marketing.70 In
addition to injuring purchasers who may purchase a product based
on false information, deception hurts rivals that engage in truthful
advertising and refuse to mislead prospective customers.71 Antitrust
law further prohibits deception if a firm employs the practice in a
monopolization effort.72 Accordingly, a firm that uses deception to
maintain a monopolistic position can violate the Lanham Act, FTC
Act, and Sherman Act.
The Sherman Act does not prohibit monopolies per se. It does
allow firms to acquire or maintain monopolies using any means,
stated that a monopoly is legal if it was acquired and maintained
73

A firm can acquire a monopoly by offering better terms to
customers or making a better product than rivals and capturing the
entire market.74 Similarly, it can obtain a monopoly by investing in
more efficient production processes that lower its cost structure and
allow it to undercut rivals on price.75 In short, the Sherman Act
encourages businesses to compete by offering more favorable terms
to trading partners, making and selling better products, and
investing in productive capacity and new production methods.
The legislative history of the Sherman Act indicates that some
drafters recognized the distinction between unfair and fair methods
of obtaining a monopoly. A senator raised the question of whether
a dealer of shorthorn cattle who obtained a monopoly on account of
his superior livestock would violate the new antitrust law.76 Senator
Hoar, a key figure in helping draft and pass the Sherman Act,
by superior skill and intelligence,
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(1), 1125(a)(1).
71. See id. § 1125(a)(1) (granting a cause of action to
supra
marketing law as fundamentally aimed at protecting consumers from being misled. But even
if such consumer protection determines the substantive norms, competitors are empowered
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988).
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
See id.
See id.
21 CONG. REC. 3151 (1890).
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a breeder of horses or raiser of cattle, or manufacturer or artisan of
any kind, got the whole business because nobody could do it as well
77
He distinguished such an
impossible for other persons to engage in fair competition, like the
engrossing, the buying up of all other persons engaged in the same
78

III. THE
S POWER TO MAKE IMPLICIT MARKET MORALITY
EXPLICIT AND CODIFY FAIR COMPETITION RULES
Businesses and the public are not resigned to accept the present
muddled and unsatisfactory state of monopolization law. The FTC
has the power to codify and strengthen rules of unfair competition. 79
Congress established the FTC to reclaim authority from the federal
judiciary and to serve as a national policymaker on fair competition.80 The FTC has broad authority to develop rules of unfair
81
To put this
congressional mandate to work, the FTC should prohibit three
categories of practice as unfair methods of competition.
A. The FTC as a Maker of Market Morality
As a means of reclaiming policymaking power from the courts in
the wake of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, Congress set up the
FTC in 1914.82 Members of Congress were outraged by the Supreme
Standard Oil.83 As
Justice Harlan wrote in a partial dissent, the Court claimed the
legislative power to decide which restraints were reasonable and
77. Id. at 3152.
78. Id.
79. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972).
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See Neil W. Averitt,
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227, 232 (1980); see also Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911).
83. See Averitt, supra note 82, at 231-32.
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which were unreasonable.84 To restore congressional supremacy, the
outlawed enumerated practices such as exclusive dealing,85 mer88
gers,86 and interlocking directorates87
Congress
intended the FTC to serve as an expert policymaking body that
would identify and prohibit unfair methods of competition over time
while being accountable to members of Congress and the public.89
Members of Congress discussed the importance of good morals
governing trade.90 For example, Senator Newlands, a key figure in
the creation of the FTC, described
91

92

Other Senate supporters of a federal commission
analogized unfair methods of competition to using brass knuckles
in a fight,93 and firms that employed su
94
Citing a political science article, members of Congress
identified localized price cutting, tying, and exclusive dealing as
unfair methods of competition.95 Senator Hollis contrasted these
96

nduct that does not necessarily
violate the Sherman and Clayton Acts.97
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 88-89 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
15 U.S.C. § 14.
Id. § 18.
Id. § 19(a)(1).
See id. § 45(a)(1)-(2).
Averitt, supra note 82, at 233-38. Congress subsequently gave the FTC authority to

unfairness authority, see Luke Herrine, The Folklore of Unfairness, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 431
(2021).
90. See Averitt, supra note 82, at 235.
91. 51 CONG. REC. 11,084 (1914).
92. Id. at 12,980.
93. Id. at 11,448.
94. Id. at 12,147.
95. Id. at 11,230-31, 16,329 (quoting William S. Stevens, Unfair Competition, 29 POL. SCI.
Q. 282, 283-84 (1914)).
96. Id. at 12,146.
97. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972).
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practices that violate the Sherman Act and the other antitrust laws,
but also practices that the Commission determines are against
98
In a 1972
public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or en99
This was in line
with earlier decisions. In FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., Justice Black, on
under § 5 to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency without proof
that they amount to an outright violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act
100

The current FTC has stated it aims to use this power. In 2015,
the FTC under Democratic Chairwoman Edith Ramirez adopted a
policy statement that indicated the Commission would apply § 5 in
a fashion largely identical to how the courts interpreted the
Sherman and Clayton Acts.101 Specifically, the Commission stated
it would use the consumer welfare standard to guide its § 5 actions
and employ the rule of reason as the default analytical framework.102 On July 1, 2021, the FTC, under new Chair Lina Khan,
rescinded this statement and announced that it will apply § 5 more
expansively, in accord with legislative intent, and use this power to
attack assorted unfair competitive practices.103
S. 447, 454 (1986) (citations omitted).
99. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. at 244.
100. 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966).
ssues Statement of Principles Regarding
Enforcement of FTC Act as a Competition Statute (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2015/08/ftc-issues-statement-principles-regarding-enforcement-ftc-act
[https://perma.cc/4NEW-46Z2]; Edward Wyatt, White House Elevates a Commissioner to
Chairwoman of the F.T.C., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/01/
business/obama-set-to-appoint-edith-ramirez-to-fill-top-ftc-post.html [https://perma.cc/ZXH45SEY].
102. FED. TRADE COMM N, STATEMENT OF ENFORCEMENT PRINCIPLES REGARDING NFAIR
METHODS OF COMPETITION UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FTC ACT (2015) https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/public_statements/735201/150813section5enforcement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z9FH-HD7Q].
103. FED. TRADE COMM N, STATEMENT OF CHAIR LINA M. KHAN (2021), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/public_statements/1591498/final_statement_of_chair_khan_joined
_by_rc_and_rks_on_section_5_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4CT-HG2X].
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B. Rules on Unfair Competition the FTC Should Establish
Using its potentially expansive authority, the FTC should
prohibit a range of unfair competitive practices. Building on existing
Sherman Act case law and its implicit norms, the FTC should target
three unfair competitive practices, whether through rulemaking104
or policy statements. It should prohibit exclusive dealing and other
exclusionary contracts by dominant firms, strengthen restrictions
on predatory pricing, and outlaw generally prohibited practices as
unfair methods of competition. These rules would spur firms to
compete by offering better terms to trading partners and improving
their goods, services, and production methods.
First, the FTC should prohibit exclusive dealing and related arrangements by dominant firms. Through exclusive dealing,
dominant firms use their power to prevent competitors from doing
business with customers, distributors, or suppliers of essential
inputs.105 For example, a dominant brewer can offer incentives to
distributors not to carry the beers of competitors.106 Through such
exclusivity by the dominant firm, smaller competitors may be
foreclosed from the normal channels of distributing their brews to
bars, restaurants, and retailers.107 To prohibit exclusive contracting
by dominant firms, the FTC should define market dominance as a
share of a relevant market greater than or equal to 30 percent.108 By
104. The D.C. Circuit held that the FTC has the authority to write competition rules.
, 482 F.2d 672 (1973); Kacyn. Fujii, National Petroleum
Refiners Is (Still) Correctly Decided, Notice & Comment (Mar. 28, 2022),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/national-petroleum-refiners-is-still-correctly-decided-by-kacyn-hfujii/.
105. See, e.g., Tripp Mickle, Craft Brewers Take Issue with AB InBev Distribution Plan,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 7, 2015, 2:16 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/craft-brewers-take-issuewith-ab-inbev-distribution-plan-1449227668 [https://perma.cc/M2FQ-BSQX].
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. The FTC currently accepts co
poly power as requiring over
50 percent of relevant market share. See Monopolization Defined, FED. TRADE COMM N,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firmconduct/monopolization-defined [https://perma.cc/LQ55-9UZC]. For precedential bases for the
30 percent threshold for dominance, see, e.g., United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229,
power from the defendants' large shares of
a highly concentrated market: In 1999, Visa U.S.A. members accounted for approximately
47% of the dollar volume of credit and charge card transactions, while MasterCard members

https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol63/iss1/8

18

Vaheesan: The Morality of Monopolization Law

2022]

THE MORALITY OF MONOPOLIZATION LAW

137

setting a market share for dominance that is lower than the existing
threshold for monopoly power, the FTC would, in line with its
109
In
July 2020, the Open Markets Institute, where I work, and a broad
public interest coalition petitioned the FTC to initiate such a rulemaking.110
Second, the FTC should prohibit below-cost pricing by dominant
and near-dominant firms. By relying on their deep pockets or
preferential access to finance, firms can run losses to undercut and
eliminate rivals who do not have the privilege of sustaining losses.111
If they succeed in excluding rivals, they can exercise dominance over
customers, suppliers, and workers.112 Importantly, such firms can
obtain a reputation as being price predators in other markets.113
for running losses against competitors.114 The FTC should prohibit
below-cost pricing by firms with a share of a relevant market
greater than or equal to 10 percent.
This rule would halt below-cost pricing strategies in their
incipiency. For instance, a large, diversified firm entering a new
product or geographic market would only have a limited opportunity
to use its financial advantages as a competitive weapon. 115 Once it
specify the smallest market share which would still be
109. See FTC v. Motion Picture Advert. Serv
Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and
and practices which, when full blown, would

110. Press Release, Open Mkts. Inst., Broad Coalition Petitions the Federal Trade
Commission to Ban Exclusionary Contracting by Monopolists (July 20, 2021),
https://www.openmarketsinstitute.org/publications/petition-federal-communicationscommission-ban-exclusionary-contracting [https://perma.cc/SW49-BPFK].
111. See Sandeep Vaheesan, Reconsidering Brooke Group: Predatory Pricing in Light of the
Empirical Learning, 12 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 81, 101-02 (2015).
112. See id.
113. Id. at 101.
114. See id.
115. The fear of large national firms using their financial power to drive out local firms
See, e.g., Moore
intrastate, interstate business could grow and expand with impunity at the expense of local

Published by William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022

19

William & Mary Law Review Online, Vol. 63 [2022], Art. 8

138

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 63:119

captured more than 10 percent of the market, it could no longer use
below-cost pricing as a competitive tactic.
Third, the FTC should hold that generally prohibited practices
are an unfair method of competition.116 As described earlier, the law
prohibits practices such as deception and property destruction,
whether done by large or small firms. A practice like deception has
no redeeming social benefits.117 Other generally applicable laws
include consumer protection, environmental, and labor laws. What
is the value in deeming a violation of labor law an unfair method of
competition too? It reinforces general social norms, embodied in law,
that certain practices are immoral and unfair. Further, running
afoul of labor law strictures, for instance, can give firms an important competitive advantage over rivals who comply with them and
falls within the ambit of competition policy in the broadest sense. 118
A former FTC chairman wrote:
Noncompliance [with various laws] could provide a major cost
advantage; a broad range of conduct that infringed legal rules
example, failing to satisfy air
pollution abatement mandates, ignoring workplace health and
safety standards, employing [undocumented immigrants] and
significant cost advantage on their wrongdoer.119

A firm that illegally thwarts the unionizing efforts of its workers can
lower its wage bill and obtain a cost advantage over a competitor

merchants. The competitive advantage would then be with the interstate combines, not by
reason of their skills or efficiency but because of their strength and ability to wage price wars.
The profits made in interstate activities would underwrite the losses of local price-cutting
116. In the late 1970s, FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk proposed using the unfair
methods of competition authority in such a fashion. See Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, Fed.
Regulation of the Association of American Law Schools 11 (Dec. 27, 1977).
117. See generally Maurice E. Stucke, When a Monopolist Deceives, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 823
(2010).
118. In the late 1970s, FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk proposed using the unfair
methods of competition authority in such a fashion. Pertschuk, supra note 116.
119. William E. Kovacic,
Chairmanship of the Federal Trade Commission 1977-1981, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1269,
1300-01 (2019) (footnotes omitted).
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that respects the legal right of its workers to organize.120 By holding
such union busting to be an unfair method of competition, the FTC
would promote high-road employment practices, discourage
lawbreaking as a method of competition, and promote honest, lawabiding business practices in general.121
tion power would channel business strategy in more socially
beneficial directions. By restricting exclusionary contracting, belowcost pricing, and general lawbreaking, the FTC would encourage
businesses to compete by offering more favorable terms to trading
partners (whether customers, suppliers, or workers), developing new
products and services, and investing in new plants, equipment, and
technologies. In other words, these rules on competition would help
foster better treatment of customers, workers, and suppliers,
innovation.
CONCLUSION
Although Congress enacted the Sherman Act more than 130 years
ago, the courts generally have not articulated the principles inidentified many practices that are illegal, including below-cost
pricing, refusals to deal, and tying.122 They, however, have failed to
explain why these practices are unfair and restricted by law. Judges
have instead applied labels such as
ulating their meaning.123 The law embodies implicit notions of
privileges, or generally prohibited conduct to acquire or perpetuate
a monopoly. The FTC can codify and strengthen these rules of
unfair conduct in general. To encourage businesses to grow through
120. See GORDON LAFER & LOLA LOUSTAUNAU, ECON. POL Y INST., FEAR AT WORK 3-5 (2020).
121. In a recent amicus brief, the U.S. Department of Justice argued that misclassification
United States Department of Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, The
Atlanta Opera, Inc. (NLRB) (Case 10-RC-276292), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/
file/1470846/download [https://perma.cc/5Q6C-HLJ2].
122. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 6.
123. See, e.g., Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 452 (7th Cir. 2020).
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124

and investment in new
plants, facilities, and technologies, the FTC should specifically
pricing and ban the use of generally prohibited practices as unfair
methods of competition.

124. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
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